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Recent advances in imaging have enabled 
the study of social rank, which refers gen-
erally to an individual’s social standing as 
either dominant or subordinate in a group, 
in relation to brain structure and function. 
From an evolutionary perspective, the mind 
is a modular structure from which various 
psychological traits and processes evolved 
in order to promote the success of the indi-
vidual and the species. Gilbert (2000) argues 
that social rank theory explains responses 
reflecting such a system, which appears 
to have functional underpinnings linking 
limbic, prefrontal, and striatal structures 
(Levitan et al., 2000). Researchers argue that 
this evolved system for responding to status 
information during social exchanges serves 
to facilitate cohesion in social rank encoun-
ters; namely, competition and/or coopera-
tion for access to resources (Gilbert, 2000; 
Levitan et al., 2000).
Several questions emerge from this evo-
lutionary perspective when considered in 
the context of social rank: How does social 
rank manifest behaviorally in humans? 
What environmental conditions might 
change how the brain uses rank to navigate 
social landscapes successfully? Furthermore, 
what are the underlying neural processes 
associated with these evolved systems?
The present discussion briefly discusses 
social rank as a theoretical construct, 
explores the behavioral manifestations of 
social rank, and reviews the neuroimaging 
support for social rank theory as a concep-
tual framework in which neural processes 
reflect an evolved psychological process. 
While a wealth of research provides con-
ceptual support for this process in the ani-
mal model (Blanchard et al., 2001; Sapolsky, 
2005; Morrison et al., 2011), here we review 
recent evidence for the neural basis of social 
rank in humans.
Social rank: theory and behavior
Social rank can be conceptualized as a 
function of several related factors, includ-
ing resource inequity, maintenance and sta-
bility of the hierarchy, subordinate coping 
strategies, mating style, personality variabil-
ity, and culture (Sapolsky, 2004, 2005). In 
humans, organizational hierarchies such as 
those found in employment settings serve to 
create natural dominants (i.e., employers) 
and subordinates (i.e., employees).
Empirical evidence for behavioral mani-
festations of social rank (i.e., the extent to 
which submissive versus dominant rank 
is associated with particular behaviors) 
implicates threat (i.e., feeling criticized) 
and inferiority as central to the social rank 
system (Fournier et al., 2002; Zuroff et al., 
2010). According to Gilbert (2005) social 
rank in humans, wherein perceived rank 
impacts the individual as much as actual 
rank (Adler et al., 2000), reflects the abil-
ity to attract the attention, admiration, 
and investment of others; when this goal is 
thwarted or unattainable, hopelessness and 
depression ensue.
How does social rank operate within a 
hierarchy in humans (i.e., what behaviors 
can be expected from dominant and sub-
ordinate individuals during rank contests)? 
Fournier et al. (2002) corroborated findings 
from primate studies (de Waal, 1989) and 
found that threat appraisals elicit escalation 
behaviors toward subordinates and de-esca-
lation behaviors toward dominant superiors. 
Specifically, findings suggest that individu-
als in a workplace setting displayed higher 
levels of dominance (e.g., stated an opin-
ion) when confronted by subordinates and 
higher levels of submissiveness (e.g., with-
held opinions; gave in) toward higher status 
others. Levels of agreeableness (e.g., words/
gestures of affection) and quarrelsomeness 
(e.g., confrontation; sarcasm) followed a 
similar pattern, suggesting a complex system 
for behavioral responses to rank contests as 
a function of affiliation and control.
Social rank processes can also predict 
group performance as a function of group 
leaders’ and members’ levels of coalition 
building (e.g., finding value in teamwork), 
dominant leadership (e.g., comfort in lead-
ership roles; self-promotion), and ruthless 
self-advancement (e.g., concealing personal 
agendas; disloyalty; competition). Groups 
perform better when group leaders and 
members are both high in coalition build-
ing, while groups with leaders and members 
all exhibiting high levels of ruthless self-
advancement appear to perform the worst 
(Kelly et al., 2011).
The complementarity hypothesis sug-
gests social rank might also be a function 
of perceived non-verbal cues. That is, 
individuals display dominance through 
postural expansion (i.e., extending limbs) 
when their equal-status though unfamiliar 
counterpart displays submission through 
postural constriction (i.e., bringing limbs 
inward; Tiedens and Fragale, 2003). In 
friendships, we see evidence that insecure 
attachment sensitizes individuals to defend 
against shame and rejection from others 
through submissive behaviors (i.e., fail-
ing to defend oneself to criticism; avoid-
ing direct eye contact; Irons and Gilbert, 
2004). While the models differ in approach, 
research seems to support the premise that 
individuals tend to behave in ways that will 
ultimately create the most comfortable rela-
tionships (Fournier et al., 2002).
An empirical question emerges: what are 
the underlying neural mechanisms orches-
trating social rank responses? An evolution-
ary perspective suggests that if social rank 
theory applies to modern human behavior, 
there may be evidence of relevant neural acti-
vation to facilitate these processes. Levitan 
et al. (2000) theorizes that a neural circuit 
linking limbic, prefrontal cortex, and striatal 
structures reflect the emotional, cognitive, 
and behavioral components of rank-related 
social interactions. Recent investigations 
examining the structure and function of 
brain areas associated with social rank offers 
preliminary support for this neural mecha-
nism of a human social rank system.
neuroanatomy of Social rank
limbic and prefrontal cortex
In an investigation of the neural mecha-
nisms responsible for processing social 
superiority and inferiority cues in both 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 123 | 1
OpiniOn Article
published: 08 May 2012
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00123
 neuroimaging research support social 
rank as a brain-based system for recog-
nizing and interpreting social status and 
rank-related information, and that future 
work may reveal the relationship of a social 
rank brain network and its role in social 
interactions.
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Striatum
Based on previous work identifying the 
ventral striatum as a primary structure 
involved in processing social status infor-
mation, Ly et al. (2011) investigated the 
relationship between one’s own hierarchi-
cal status and brain activation during pro-
cessing of status information. Specifically, 
the authors examined striatal activity using 
fMRI in individuals with varying levels of 
perceived rank, by presenting participants 
with pictures of individuals labeled as com-
paratively high and low status relative to 
the participant. Results showed that striatal 
activity was dependent on the participant’s 
perceived status. High-status individu-
als exhibited a greater striatal response to 
images of higher status people, and low 
status participants exhibited a greater stri-
atal response to images of lower-status peo-
ple. The authors note that self-similarity 
and actual rank status are likely not solely 
responsible for explaining the observed 
effect of relative hierarchical status on 
striatal activation.
concluSion
The neuroimaging evidence discussed here 
provides preliminary support for the role 
of limbic, prefrontal, and striatal pathways 
in human social rank processing. However, 
other brain structures may also be impli-
cated, including visual associative process-
ing areas (i.e., intraparietal sulci; Chiao 
et al., 2009).
In summary, these findings suggest 
that social hierarchy stability and per-
ceived rank differentially impact the neu-
ral activation of relative status processing. 
It should also be noted that no empirical 
study to date has specifically examined 
the neural bases of involuntary defeat 
strategies (IDS) associated with social 
rank, and this gap in the literature offers 
fertile ground for future investigations. 
While the empirical understanding of the 
behavioral manifestations of social rank in 
various social strata (e.g., SES) is specu-
lative, the link between a particular rank 
status and deleterious health outcomes is 
clear for subordinates (presumably low 
SES; Adler et al., 2000; Sapolsky, 2005) 
and highest ranking dominants (presum-
ably high SES, Gesquiere et al., 2011) and 
future research might further shed light on 
these phenomena. What can be concluded 
from the present literature is that extant 
stable and unstable hierarchies, Zink et al. 
(2008) used fMRI to measure brain acti-
vation in participants presented with an 
interactive game in which simulated players 
were manipulated to be either superior or 
inferior in game-related skills. The simu-
lated players’ statuses were held constant 
in a contrived “stable hierarchy” condition 
and allowed to vary periodically during a 
contrived “unstable hierarchy” condition. 
Results indicated that in a stable hierarchy, 
viewing a superior, relative to an inferior 
player activates bilateral occipital/parietal 
cortex, striatum, parahippocampal cor-
tex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. No 
unique activation associated with viewing 
an inferior player was identified. Specific 
to the unstable hierarchy condition, several 
additional brain areas were recruited when 
viewing the superior player. These include 
the bilateral thalamus, right amygdala, pos-
terior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, 
premotor cortex, somatosensory cortex, 
and supplementary motor area. The find-
ings of this study suggest that stability 
of the hierarchy differentially affects the 
neural processing of social status cues and 
supports the hypothesized role of corti-
colimbic and prefrontal cortex in social 
rank processing.
Gianaros et al. (2007) investigated the 
effects of perceived social status on neuro-
logical health using MRI data to uncover 
structural changes involved in the stress of 
lower social status. Results showed that self-
reported low social status predicted reduced 
gray matter volume in the perigenual area of 
the anterior cingulate cortex, a paralimbic 
brain region implicated in adaptive emo-
tional and physiological responding to psy-
chosocial stressors. This pattern held even 
when accounting for other demographic 
(e.g., age, sex), psychological (e.g., depres-
sive symptomatology), and conventional 
(e.g., SES) variables. Contrary to expecta-
tions, no associations were found between 
subjective SES and amygdala gray matter 
volume, which the authors interpret to 
be a result of methodological limitations 
(i.e., failure of voxel-based morphometry 
to uncover neuronal and cellular changes). 
Such reduced gray matter volume, par-
ticularly in the brain areas responsible for 
responding to psychosocial stressors, might 
be associated with mood and stress dysregu-
lation (Sapolsky, 2004, 2005; Gesquiere 
et al., 2011).
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